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The first use of the modern day attack drone by the United States was in Afghanistan in
mid 2002, and for the past 11 years attack drones have been used by the United States in as many
countries as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. When considering the alternatives to using drones,
such as sending marines on the ground to complete a mission or flying a piloted jet over enemy
territory to gather intelligence, as well as the military power that the use of these vehicles
projects, the attack drone has become the weapon of choice in the war on terror for both the Bush
and the Obama administrations. The continuous use of these attack drones for the past 11 years
can be defined as the Bush-Obama drone doctrine, a doctrine that has become an important part
of US foreign policy, and thus, has had international repercussions. To explore and examine
these international repercussions, and apply the lessons learned from reoccurring drone strikes in
Pakistan, is the purpose of this paper.
As pilotless drone attacks are a relatively new phenomena, the topic of drone attacks and
reviews of the drone doctrine are relatively new to the academic community. That being said,
there have been several important works discussing the legality and morality of the drone
policy.1 Yet, the majority of works, including the aforementioned, have analyzed the policy
either from a United States domestic perspective, a bilateral perspective between a state and a
transnational non-state actor, or by case study. In sum, there has been little work in the academic
field addressing the drone policy from a truly international perspective.
This paper approaches the Drone Doctrine from an international perspective, and does so
by incorporating several international legal principles and customary norms, the reports and
statements of international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the United Nations High Commission of Human Rights, as well as present and past members
from these organizations, and other experts and scholars across the international community. The
Drone Doctrine itself is an international policy, affecting the whole international community, and
thus, to fully understand the doctrine, it is advantageous for it to be viewed from an international
vantage point.

Preface
As a member of the college democrats at my home university, and a ranking member in
our school’s debate team, I had the distinct opportunity to work with many intelligent and
interesting people from all across the country, and I became very close with the professor who is
the faculty advisor for the debate team. One of the things he mentioned to while we were talking
1

See Daniel Statman’s essay Can Just War Theory Justify Targeted Killing?, Jeff McMahan’s essay Targeted
Killing: Murder, Combat or Law Enforcement?, and Andre Altman’s book Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in
an Asymmetrical World.
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one time was the US use of drones in war. I had never heard of this before, and the idea, novel as
it was, appealed to me. He showed me a page on the New York Times website that was a debate
board, where an individual from anywhere in the world could post their arguments for or against
the US’ use of drones. I read this almost religiously and began to read many publications about
drones and realized the importance of this topic.
That was really what initially sparked my own personal interest in attack drones. Upon
deciding to come and study in Geneva, I knew that there would opportunities to speak with
experts all across the field of international relations, but I had initially wanted to explore this
issue of drones from the private sector. In other words, I wanted to understand the relationship
between private drone contractors and governments in the United States and why it is important
to understand that relationship. To this point I reached out to several military contractors not only
within Geneva but across Europe. I waited two weeks and received 0 replies. Contemplating the
difficulties of talking to people in the private sector, I readjusted the perspective of my paper to
that of international public law and customary norms; namely IHL and IHRL. I quickly found
that there are a plethora of experts working on those topics here in Geneva, especially in the
ICRC and the UNHCHR.
Upon further reviewing the literature involving drones, I found myself continuously
reading similar arguments, and they all shared one thing in common: regardless of their ethical or
legal conclusions, they were considering a hypothetical drone strike, an isolated occurrence, one
that hasn’t occurred yet. This was befuddling to me, for we now have 11 years of empirical data
on which we can evaluate strikes that have already happened. To this point, I had initially wanted
to empirically analyze the effects and consequences of drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia, but I quickly found, that due to the very limited information available about
strikes in these countries, and given the purpose of this paper, that would be impossible. I was
able to meet with an expert in Pakistan-American relations, and concluded that it would be more
realistic to focus on one country in particular, Pakistan, rather than trying to include all the
countries.Thus, this is why the report is focusing on Pakistan.
Finally, this paper confronts the moral and legal crisis that is happening in Pakistan right
now through a human lens and a legal lens. I remember very early on in the course of this report
reflecting on the age old proverb: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” And
when I began researching the effects and consequences of the doctrine, I began to think: what if
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Pakistan was doing what America is doing in their country in our country? What if the Pakistani
government had a drone doctrine it has been applying for 11 years in America? What if, despite
the public outcry, our government was incapable or unwilling of stopping this? These questions
made me ask if any country in the world should be able to depart from the laws of combat, if any
country in the world should be able to disregard the principles of sovereignty and neutrality, or if
country in the world should be allowed to undermine IHL and IHRL customary norms, for, are
not all countries equal under the law? These questions are what guide this paper throughout.
Moreover, it is important to note where the empirical evidence that is going to support
my claim comes from. There are many different places that one can find statistics on drone
strikes. Yet, after review of much of the the literature, I noticed that many journals used the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. I searched further and concluded that this was the most
reliable place to receive the data from. Thus, that is why these statistics are used.

Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Michael and Ann Marie. They have been
my role models my whole life, and without their constant support and their continual love, I
would not be where I am today. They have provided me with this incredible opportunity to study
in Geneva, Switzerland. I would also like to thank the rest of my family, my three sisters Alex,
Brittany and Janie, and my four brothers, David, John Paul, Luke and Mark, for being exemplars
of love and support.
I would like to acknowledge and thank the School for International Training (SIT) for hosting
this program. The Academic Directors, Dr. Lambert and Dr. Csurgai; The Academic
Coordinator, Aline Dunant; The Homestay Coordinator, Cristina Cornes; and countless others
who made this semester’s program possible. Thank you to those who helped make my research
possible and advanced my understanding of this fascinating field. Thank you to my academic

6

advisor, Dr. Alexandre Vautravers, whose guidance proved critical to the completion of this
paper. Thank you to those who spent moments of their valuable time to allow me to interview
them about a whole range of topics. Without their expertise, this paper would lack a deep
understanding of the issue.
Thank you to my homestay family for making my time in Switzerland such a wonderful
experience. But more importantly, thank you for putting up with me through this semester and
making this time truly a remarkable experience.
I would also like to acknowledge my fellow classmates who embarked on this journey with me,
for without them, I do not think I would still be sane. They have reminded me that not all life is
work, and that a little fun (not too much of course) can go a long way.
Finally, to the countless others who are not mentioned above who made this semester possible:
thank you.

I. Introduction
“Do the United States and its people really want to tell those of us who live in the rest of the world that President
Obama can sign off on a decision to kill us with less worry about judicial scrutiny than if the target is an American?
Would your Supreme Court really want to tell humankind that we, like the slave Dred Scott in the 19th century, are
not as human as you are? ”
-Archbishop Desmond Tutu in a letter to the New York Times, February 2013.2

“I think its a good program and I don’t disagree with the basic policy that the Obama administration is pursuing
now in that regards.”
-Former Vice President Dick Cheney, on CBS’ “This Morning.” -January 2012.3

Through the 20th and 21st centuries, the nature of war has changed dramatically. As the
nature of war changed, the people affected by wars changed; shifting from primarily soldiers and

2
3

Tutu, Desmond. “A Call to Civility.” New York Times, 12 February 2013. Accessed 24 April 2013.
Cheney, Dick. The Morning Show. CBS. January 2012. Youtube. Accessed 24 April 2013.
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armed combatants to innocent civilians and children.4 In a new battlefield, a new weapon, the
attack drone, has contributed to the changing nature of warfare because the people that it
impacts, excessively, are civilians and children. As such, the evolved attack drones are
effectively weapons of war; that, in present times, are being used by the United States
government to carry out extrajudicial assassinations of high value military targets all over the
world.
To this point, this paper is comprehensive. It examines the Drone Doctrine through an
international legal lens and demonstrates the doctrine has been inconsistent with principles of the
law of armed conflict and IHL and IHRL customary norms. It documents the effects of the
doctrine through a human lens by magnifying the consequences on innocent and unarmed
civilians in the nation of Pakistan, and indicates, through empirical evidence, that the innocence
lost has outweighed the benefits gained. It authenticates the claim that the drone doctrine in it of
itself is counterproductive to US strategic and military interests. And finally, it calls on the US to
be more accountable in its application of the doctrine, severely limit the amount of drone attacks
in the future, and make changes and adjustments to the Drone Doctrine that are more respective
of the fundamental and most basic rights international law protects.

II: The Evolution of Pilotless Flying Aircrafts and the
Development of Attack Drones
2.0 Introduction
This section explores the evolution of pilotless flying vehicles to the development of
modern day attack drones. This is important to note because it is demonstrates that pilotless
flying vehicles were born out of war and were to be used in war. Even since the first
manifestation of this idea into a reality, these have been weapons of war. The historical relevance
of this section is that it provides a lens through which to view present day drone attacks.
2.1 Balloons Over Venice
The military practice of using drones in war is not new. It traces its lineage all the way back to the
19th century.5 In August of 1849, the then mighty Austrian empire, already in control of much of

modern day Italy, set its sights on conquering the city of Venice. Austrian artillery general and
4

International Committee for the Red Cross. “A Brief Introduction to International Humanitarian Law.” ICRC
Headquarters. School for International Training. Lecture. Geneva, Switzerland. 26 February 2013.
5
Veuthey, Michael. Personal Interview.April 29 2013. WMO headquarters. Geneva, Switzerland.
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famed inventor, Franz von Uchatius, realized, that when considering the topography and
geography of the city of Venice, laying a siege on the city would be particularly difficult and cost
too much; miltarality and fiscally.6 As necessity is the mother of invention, Uchatius had an
innovative solution: use unmanned balloons to remotely fly over the city and bombard the
enemy7, thereby minimizing Austrian losses while maximizing Venicean losses. The Scientific
American reported Uchatius’ plans in March of 1849:
"Venice is to bombarded by five balloons, each twenty-three feet in diameter. . . in a favorable wind, and
the balloons will be launched and directed as near to Venice as possible, and on their being brought to
vertical positions over the town, they will be fired by electro magnetism by means of a long isolated copper
8

wire. . . the bomb falls perpendicularly, and explodes on reaching the ground.

"

Unfortunately, an unexpected shift of the wind drove some of the balloons back to the Austrian
camp, and consequently, after that, their use was abandoned.9 Despite the failure, this event is
important because it marked for the first time in recorded history the use of unmanned flying
vessels as a weapon in war, and the idea lived on, for once winged aircraft was invented, using
unmanned winged aircraft for military purposes would soon follow, and eventually be realized.
2.2 Target Practice
After the first successful wireless transmission in 1896 and then the first successful flight
of the airplane in 1908, the idea of developing unmanned aircraft, and then, subsequently, using
the aircraft in war, was reborn. Although dramatically different than flying balloons, with the
outset of the first World War reaching the United States in 1916, inventors, scientists and
military men all over the country revisited the idea of pilotless bombing machines. On
September 12, 1916, the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane, or the "flying bomb," made its first
successful flight, demonstrating that the once abstract idea was now a palpable reality.10 One
year later, in November of 1917, after news of this flying bomb gained media attention, it was
6

McDaid Hugh and Barton Strong. "Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology."RPAV: Remote Piloted Aerial
Vehicles. Aviation and Aeromodelling-Interdependent Evolutions and Histories, 02 February 2003.
7
See picture below: Uchatius Design
8
"More About Balloons." The Scientific American. March 1849, pg 3. As Reported in the Presse of Vienna, Austria,
March 1849..
9
McDaid Hugh and Barton Strong.
10
Pearson, Lee. "Developing the Flying Bomb." Encyclopedia of World Aircraft (2004): History.navy. Naval Air
Systems Command, 04 September 2004.
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flown for representatives of the United States army.11 Intrigued at the technological
sophistication of this machine, and contemplating the military advantage to be gained from it, the
army of the United States commissioned these scientists to build an “aerial torpedo,”12 which
resulted in the Kettering Bug-the earliest predecessor to present day cruise missiles.13 Although
the Kettering Bug was successfully flown and capable of striking ground targets up to 75 miles
away, it was not completed until after the first World War was already over14, and thus never
saw the field of battle.
During the years between the interwar period, the British and American governments
continued to show interest in developing pilotless target aircraft.15 But it wasn’t until the
outbreak of the Second World War that unmanned aircrafts would be produced on a mass scale.
Originally from Great Britain, Reginald Denny, an inventor and a scientist, moved to the United
States during the 1930’s and created an initial, low cost remote control aircraft. Successively, he
and his partners started a business which would eventually become “Radioplane Company,” and
spent 10 years adjusting and correcting his original prototypes. Eventually in 1940, after a
successful demonstration of the flying aircraft to the US army, Denny and his company were
awarded a bountiful contract with the United States army to produce remote controlled airplanes
that would be used in target practice for anti aircraft weapons.16 Indeed, throughout the Second
World War, Denny and his company produced nearly fifteen thousand drones that were
purchased by the United States army.17 The creation of these remote controlled flying machines,
coined as “Dennymites,” and the purchasing of the invention by a public entity, in this case the
United States army,18 represents the important and intricate relationship between private
individuals and private military manufacturers and governments, a reality, which, like remote
controlled flying bombers, would continue to evolve and develop alongside history.

11

ibid.
ibid.
13
ibid.
14
Cornelisse, Diana G. Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the United States Air
Force During the First Century of Powered Flight. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: U.S. Air Force
Publications, 2002.
15
Donald, David, edition 12. Encyclopedia of World Aircraft, Chapter 36: Standard Aircraft. Etobicoke, Ontario.
Prospero Books, 1997, pg.854.
16
CTIE: Reginald Denny (1891-1967), The “Dennyplane” RPAV: Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles. Aviation and
Aeromodelling-Interdependent Evolutions and Histories, 04 July 2003.
17
ibid.
18
ibid.
12
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2.3 Reconnaisse Drones

As the Second World War officially
ended in late 1945, the United States’ strategic focus in the world shifted; and so did the strategic
use and purpose of unmanned flying drones. Moving away from simply using the drones for
target practice, the United States army and air force wanted the pilotless flying vehicles to be
used for reconnaissance purposes to spy on their enemies.19 In many ways, the reconnaissance
drones that were built during this time period were similar to their eventual successors,
weaponized drones, however, they had a vee tail and were about twice as heavy.20 Furthermore,
several models, such as the Ryan Model 147 Lighting Bug in 195321 and the Aerojet-General
MQM-58 Overseer in 1964, were successfully converted to reconnaissance drones, and were
used by the United States army to spy and gather information on as many countries as the USSR,
North Vietnam, Communist China, and North Korea throughout the 1960s and 1970s.22 This is
an essential development in the history of pilotless flying drones, because the desire for pilotless
flying drones was born from fears of human pilots being captured or shot down while conducting
intelligence missions over hostile territories; a fear which was realized in the infamous case of
U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, who was shot down and captured while flying over the USSR.
Historian John Regianle points out, “The U-2 Incident left the Americans humiliated politically
and technologically. . . with the Soviets now able to bring down the high flying spy planes, the

19

Donald, David, pg 867.
ibid, pg. 855.
21
See attached picture entitled Lighting Bug.
22
Goebel, Greg. “Air Vectors: Chapter 3: The Lighting Bug Reconnaissance Drones.” ed., 2.0.0., United States,
March 2008.
20
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West had to turn to other means of intelligence gathering.23” When weighing the military options
and the human security risks, and considering geopolitical strategic interests, the US government
concluded that it is better to have an unmanned aircraft fly over hostile enemy zones than it is for
manned aircraft to, granted the unmanned aircraft is sophisticated enough to conduct its missions
without being noticed by the enemy. This became a key proponent in the logic for using
unmanned reconnaissance aircrafts to gather information; and as unmanned aircrafts themselves
developed into attack drones, proponents of this argument would be applied in the modern era to
justify weaponized drone strikes.
2.4 Attack Drones
The modern era24 brought with it many dramatic changes to the application and
construction of pilotless flying aircraft, but perhaps most noteworthy, it began the transition from
strictly flying reconnaissance vehicles to fully militarized drones. One of the first jet-propelled
targets, and one of the most widespread unmanned flying aircrafts ever used for reconnaissance
but capable of firing fatal missiles, is the Teledyne-Ryan Firebee, or the BQM-34A.25 Although
production ended in 1982, the production line was reopened in 1986 and would continue to
develop all the way into the 1990s. The Firebee is a simple, reliable and somewhat sophisticated
target vehicle that has the capability to fire heat-seeking missiles aimed from the wingtips, and,
although it is rarely used in the field of battle, has proven remarkably successful in intelligence
gathering missions.26 Indeed, this particular model is still in operation with the US Navy, it has
been used by the Canadian Air Force and the Japanese Self-Defense forces, as well as a small
number supplied to NATO, and thus, is an internationally used drone.27 Despite the initial
success of the BQM-34A, and the incredible technological sophistication of the vehicle for the
time, during the end of the 1980’s, the United States government seemed disinterested in further
pursuing pilotless vehicles. By 1991, the Pentagon was forced to consolidate its UAV research
into a single Joint Program Office, which had little financial autonomy and virtually no budget.28

23

Regianle, John. "Biography of Francis Gary Powers." National Cold War Database. Royal Air Force, 05 July
2012.
24
In the context of this report, we can define the modern era as 1980-present day.
25
Donald, David, pg 959.
26
ibid; pg. 859.
27
Goebel, Greg. “Air Vectors Chapter 4: Modern US Target Drones”. ed., 2.0.0, United States. March 2008..
28
ibid.
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When the Bosnian wars hit the former Yugoslav peninsula in 1992, where hundreds of
thousands of lives were lost, in accordance with NATO and UN peacekeeping forces, the US
government issued a statement pledging continual support to its allies by taking various steps,
that among them the advancement of reconnaissance drones, or UAVs.29 Because of the
Congressional budget cuts and the consolidation of the drone program years earlier, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), who was frustrated at the incoherent and unreliable information it
was receiving from UAVs flying over Bosnia, was able to circumvent a legal loophole and
effectively take control of the drone program, a program they would continue to control for the
next decade.30 As such, by 1995, the inefficiency of the GNAT-750 and the outdated BQM-34A,
coupled with the CIA’s desire to have more reliable intelligence from more reliable UAVs, gave
rise to the creation of the infamous Predator Drone, a weapon which would be used in hundreds
of reconnaissance missions by the CIA and the US government for several years.31 The Predator
Drone had several important upgrades from the GNAT-750 and the BQM-34A such as a
“deicing” system, reinforced wings, and a laser guided targeting system;32 all of which would
play crucial roles in the development of attack drones in the coming years.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the drone program, like United States
foreign policy, took a dramatic turn. A rather ecstatic Bush administration, at the
recommendation of the CIA, decided it an important strategic priority to quicken and complete
the transition from reconnaissance and early predator drones into fully armed and militarized
drone weapons, which would be capable of remotely firing missiles accurately and repetitively at
military targets abroad.33 To these ends, the president constructed a secret list of High Value
Targets (HVTs) that the CIA was authorized to kill by way of targeted drone assassinations;
further officially transferring the responsibility and jurisdiction of drone strikes away from
elected officials of the government and to the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.34
This relationship between the CIA and the US government is an essential part of the BushObama drone doctrine; and the results of this relationship were on full display from the first ever
29

ibid.
Shaw, Ian. “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones”, Student Research Database.,
January 2013.
31
ibid.
32
Clode, George. "Predator Drone Specifications." Military History Monthly 12 (2012): 1-12.Student Research
Guide.
33
Shaw, Ian.
34
ibid; pg. 2.
30
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drone strike that occurred near the city of Khost, Afghanistan on February 4, 2002. The CIA
believed to have intelligence that a man walking down a street, who was surrounded by several
armed guards, was none other than Osama Bin Laden himself.35 Of course, the man was not Bin
Laden, nor was he even a high level military target.36 Nonetheless, because Osama was on the
kill list, and thus had congressional and executive approval, the strike was issued, and the price
to pay from this faulty information was catastrophic; taking the life of 29 innocent and unarmed
civilians.37 This event marked for the first time in United States history that a targeted military
drone was used as an attack weapon in war; for one sovereign state, the United States, flew a
weapon into another sovereign state, Afghanistan, and proceeded to use this weapon to kill
innocent and unarmed citizens who, in reality, demonstrated no active hostilities or posed
imminent threats to the security of the United States.38 These attacks, which mustn’t be mistaken
as acts of peace, rather understood as acts of war, have been and are continually used by the US
against sovereign and independent nations; and today, they are being used in states where there is
not officially declared war. This is dangerous because accountability is limited enough in the
case of declared war; in an undeclared war, it all but disappears.39 Because the decision to strike
was made by an entity of the government, its Central Intelligence Agency, a dangerous doctrine
began to form, a doctrine which would have severe international repercussions, especially with
strikes being continued in Pakistan,Yemen and Somalia in the years to come.
2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the evolution of unmanned flying aircrafts stretched over two centuries;
from remotely fired balloons in the late 19th century to unmanned vehicles like the Kettering
Bug used by the US army for target practice in the middle of the 20th century, up to intelligence
and reconnaissance spying aircrafts, such as the Dennymite, through the end of the 20th century,
all the way to the weaponized attack drones in the early 21st century. The historical relevance of
the development of attack drones is that it provides a context through which to view present day
drone strikes, and analyze the applied doctrine. All in all, although the types of flying unmanned

35

ibid; pg. 3.
Gobel, Greg.
37
Miller, Greg, and Julie Tate. "CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03
Sept. 2011.
38
Was this a mistake, a result of human error? Even it was just a mistake, are not mistakes still crimes?
39
Mohamedou, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould. Personal Interview. GCSP Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland. April
26, 2013.
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aircrafts vary according to the time period they were used, and the specs and capabilities have
dramatically changed throughout the centuries, one single strain of truth remains constant
throughout: these are weapons of war. And these weapons of war are now being used to carry out
extrajudicial assassinations that are “targeted” and “surgical.” What have been the results and
consequences of these new weapons attacking suspected perpetrators abroad?

III: Drone Doctrine Applied in Pakistan
3.0 Introduction
Before the legality of the doctrine can be considered, or the international nature of the
attacks can be discussed on a unilateral scale, the attacks that have transpired since 2004 and that
are continually transpiring, particularly in the independent nation of Pakistan, should first be
understood. To this point, this section approaches the drone doctrine of the United States in two
different perspectives: 1) the nation affected, Pakistan, and 2) the nation affecting, the United
States, and shows that not only have the attacks repeatedly damaged innocent civilians, or non
combats, in Pakistan, but the drone doctrine applied in Pakistan has been counterproductive for
the United States. In order to do this, the relationship between the US and Pakistan since its birth
in 1947 is discussed, noting the progression of the relationship before 9/11, and the relationship
in a post 9/11 world. It then examines the history of United States drone attacks in Pakistan, and
outlines, with the best available data, the frequency at which the strikes have been employed. It
explores the repercussions the strikes have had on the fragile and at times non-existent
relationship between the two states, the growing unlikelihood of future bilateral diplomatic
cooperation between the two governments and the human repercussions the application of the
drone doctrine has on ordinary citizens; physically and psychologically.
3.1 US-Pakistan Bilateral Relations
To begin, after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the new nation, led by its foremost
founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, sought US financial assistance, and thus reached out to
US leaders.40 Jinnah told the American government that having an ally in Pakistan was important
because it was a geostrategic pivot zone and an armed buffer zone between major opposing
powers.41 The new leader also warned that Soviet involvement in the region would be
40

Haqqani, Husain. "A Realistic Approach to US-Pakistani Relations." Center for the National Interest. (2012):
Student Research Center. pg. 1.
41
ibid; pg. 1.
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detrimental to US global interests, and asked the American government for two billion dollars
worth of aid.42 Although the United States did extend aid to the new country, it was far short of
what Jinnah had asked, a measly sum of ten million dollars.43 This was an important event in the
relationship between the two countries because it effectively represents the strained relationship
between Pakistan and the US; a strain that would follow them through the next century.44
In the 1950s, relations between the two states officially entered the “alliance” phase after
India rebuffed the Eisenhower administration's attempt to enter into an anti-communist
alliance.45 The United States then turned to Pakistan, entering into a mutual defense pact against
communist aggression.46 However, when the Indo-Pakistani war broke out in 1965, the United
States cut aid to both belligerents, and this infuriated Islamabad.47 In 1980, nearly 15 years later,
the two states cooperated in the attempts to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan; yet, because the
interests for each state were different-the US wanted to fend off a communist advance, while
Pakistan wanted to thwart an Indian aligned country48-the cooperation in the aftermath of the
Afghanistan intervention was severely limited.49 The same was the case in the post 9/11 era, in
Afghanistan again, for as a result of different geopolitical and strategic interests in the area,
namely that the US wanted to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Pakistan wanted to expel
Indian influence, contributed to and helped foster future mutual distrust between the two states.50
Although the United States, in recent years, has given billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan and
has declared Pakistan a friend in the region,51 according to a recent Pew poll, 74% of Pakistanis
view the United States as an enemy.52 The true root of this is the unfulfilled expectations of an
alliance that lacks deep convergence of interests;53 and undoubtedly, the recent drone attacks

42

ibid; pg. 1.
ibid; pg. 1.
44
Asbjornsen, Stee. Personal Interview. OHCHR headquarters. Geneva, Switzerland. April 24, 2013.
45
Haqqani, Husain.
46
Absbjomsen, Stee.
47
Haqqani, Husain; pg. 2.
48
ibid; pg. 2.
49
Kronstadt, Alan K. "Pakistan-US Relations." CRS Issue Brief For Congress OB94041 (2005): 10-49. Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.
50
Haqqani, Husain, pg. 4.
51
Kronstadt, Alan K.
52
Pew Research Center, Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of the US: 74% Call America an Enemy.
(March 2012). Web.
53
Asbjornsen, Stee.
43

16

have contributed to the dislike of the United States.54 In sum, the United States and Pakistan have
had a strained relationship from its very conception in 1947, and since then, different geopolitical
and strategic interests between the two countries have left Americans and Pakistanis alike are in
a state of mutual distrust of each other. And adding to the already complex relationship have
been the constant drone attacks in Pakistan, which began in 2004.
3.2 Drone Attacks in Pakistan Since 2004
In recent years, Pakistan has become the single largest recipient of US drone attacks and
extrajudicial killings in the world.55 According the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ),
who, due to the United States government’s and the CIA’s attempts to keep drone strike statistics
confidential and classified,56 is the best available public aggregate database on drone attacks,
there were 52 CIA issued drone attacks in Pakistan from 2004-2009, which killed 416-599
people, resulting in as many as 292 civilian deaths and 123 child deaths.57 Since the Obama
administration took power in early 2009, there has been no stoppage of the policy, in fact, in
2009 alone, the CIA, under the Obama administration, issued more drone attacks in Pakistan, 53,
than the Bush administration did in 4 years, 52;58 strikes which left as many as 729 Pakistanis
were killed, with as many as 207 civilian deaths and 41 child deaths.59 From 2010-2013, the
drone policy of targeted assassinations and extrajudicial killings continued in Pakistan, with 95
total drone attacks being issued, leaving an estimated 1,094 Pakistanis dead; 292 civilians and 29
children.60 In sum, the TBIJ reports, that from June 2004 through mid March 2013, drone strikes
killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children61
According to this data, one thing is clear: US drone strikes have repeatedly occurred in Pakistan;
and show no sign of slowing in the years to come.
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3.3 Consequences
The official stance of the US government is that little or no civilian lives are taken from
drone strikes; and moreover, the US government claims that the strikes are “targeted” and
“surgical,” and impact only those people who have been classified as high level enemy
combatants.62 But is this the case? Is what is being officially reported representative of reality? In
September of 2012, two researchers, one from New York University and one from Stanford
University, traveled to Pakistan for nine months to complete an in-depth and on the ground case
study on the effects of drone strikes on local communities; seeking to answer the aforementioned
questions. The resulting case study, entitled Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to
Civilians From Drone Practices in Pakistan, is an essential source to anybody seriously
examining US drone doctrine. The researchers criticize the US drone doctrine by presenting an
in depth case study that documents the horrific reality for the those who live under drones in
Pakistan.
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Firstly, according to the researchers, the effects of drone strikes in Pakistan, includes
severe damage to infrastructure, immense civilian casualties and what's not reported,63 is that
they threaten the sanity and safety entire communities.64 They explain: “Drones hover twentyfour hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public
spaces without warning. . . Their presence terrorizes men, women and children, giving rise to
anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities.”65 Hence, according to these
researchers, the Pakistani people who live under drones have a constant worry, from the moment
they wake up to the moment they go to sleep, that at any moment and without warning, a drone
may strike them and their loved ones; and they have to live with the fact that they are powerless
to do anything to protect and/or defend themselves.66 Secondly, the official information that is
being released to the American public and the international community about the effectiveness of
drone strikes in Pakistan, namely that the strikes are disrupting and destroying members of AlQaeda with minimal civilian “blowback,”67 is a claim that is far from the truth, the researchers
argue.68 Moreover, this claim has been indeed reported to be false by several major news outlets,
academic peer reviewed publications and national newspapers. For instance, Peter Bergen and
Megan Barun of CNN reported in 2012 that “the number of high level targets killed in drone
strikes as a percentage of total casualties is extremely low-estimated at just 2%.”69 In addition,
this report also raises a key point, that is, viewing the effects through just numbers of people who
are killed from the attacks is not necessarily representative of the complete reality; for there are
countless number of people who are physiologically affected and induced into living in a state of
fear who do show up in statistics.70 Moreover, not only are the attacks inefficient, but the
counterproductivity of drone strikes must be seriously considered as well, namely that the strikes
facilitate recruitment to violent and non-state armed groups and motivate further violent attacks
63
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against the United States. Such points have begun to be raised by many across the academic
community.71 Indeed, and rather ironically, the New York Times reported in 2012, that “drones
have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants in Pakistan.”72
3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, drone attacks in Pakistan, and the continuation of the attacks through the
codification of doctrine by the United States government and its Central Intelligence agency,
have been inefficient, counterproductive, and highly damaging. They are inefficient because they
kill far more innocent people that pose no imminent threat to the United States than they do high
level military enemy combatants who have violently attacked the United States. This claim is
supported by the statics and reporting done by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. They are
counterproductive because with each inocent mother, father, daughter and brother killed by a
drone strike, a sentiment of hate and distrust may grow towards the perpetrator, the United
States. Thus, rather than discouraging acts of terror against the United States, the United States is
giving the people its trying to discourage all the more reasons to do exactly the opposite of what
it wants. This claim is supported by a public survey poll of Pakistani people, in which 74% of the
people viewed America as an enemy. Finally, they are highly damaging, in two respects. First,
they destroy houses, roads and grocery stores, obliterate entire areas of land and living spaces,
and kill innocent people. Second, they inflict huge amounts of suffering that goes beyond
infrastructure damage and physical death, leaving civilians anxious, scared, and psychologically
damaged. This claim is supported by a case study done by researchers at Stanford and NYU. If
the application of the Drone Doctrine has excessively injured and severely killed innocent
people, then where does the justification, legally, to continue applying the doctrine, come from?

IV. United States Legal Argument Supporting the
Drone Doctrine
4.0 Introduction
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Two things have been established so far in this report: 1) Unmanned flying vehicles have
dramatically evolved over the past two hundred years, and today, militarized and weaponized
flying drones are capable of repeatedly and remotely firing lethal missiles which kill targets
abroad; 2) Since 2002, the US government, in coordination with the CIA, has issued countless
drone attacks, more than half of which occurring in the independent nation of Pakistan, and,
when considering US strategic interests and the human consequences of drone strikes for
Pakistani people, the attacks have been inefficient, counterproductive and highly damaging.
Moving forward, the US legal justification for the continuation of the strikes will be thoroughly
described, as so the Drone Doctrine may be understood and, in the second half of this paper,
clearly compared and analyzed under the principles of international humanitarian law and
customary international norms, and eventually demonstrated to be inconsistent with these legal
frameworks. Thus, the immediately following section is primarily descriptive.73
4.1 Self-Defense
The Department of Justice (DOJ) argues in this report that the president of the United
States has the authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by Al-Qa’ida and its associated
forces; that “targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent
attack to the United States is not unlawful. . . it is a lawful act of self-defense.74” Moreover, “a
lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent with international legal principles of
sovereignty and neutrality75” The United States, argues the DOJ, is presently engaged in an
armed conflict with Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces,76 and during this armed conflict, and
necessarily only because of this conflict, the president of the United States has the authority to
protect the nation because of the inherent right to national self-defense;77 the basis of which, the
DOJ cites, can be found in the United Nations Charter, article 51, which states:
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.78

It is rather ironic that the DOJ uses this particular article as its basis for justifying the strikes as
acts of national self defense; for the article clearly states that states do have an inherent right to
national self defense, but it also states that in the execution of this right, the actions must be
immediately reported to the Security Council, something the US has clearly neglected. Has the
US not picked and chosen what parts of the charter to adhere to? Does this not undermine the
legitimacy and authority of the charter itself?
Subsequently, the report argues that the “like the imposition of military detention, the use
of lethal force against such enemy forces is an important incident of war.”79 Moreover, they
make the claim that military necessity, a key principle in the law of armed conflict and thus
international humanitarian law, “admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed enemies.”80
Continually, the DOJ argues that “those who take up arms [against the United States] may be
targeted at any time.”81 Finally, the DOJ makes it clear that “when a person takes up arms or
merely dons a uniform as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to an
enemy attack.”82 In sum, the DOJ, in an official United States memorandum justifying the use of
lethal force on enemy combatants through drone strikes, argues that because the US is currently
involved in an armed conflict with Al-Qaida, any person who shows active hostilities towards
the US, or even wears a military uniform, can be targeted and killed by a drone attack that has
been authorized by the president of the United States; and that this authorization gains its
legitimacy from the inherent right to national self-defense found in the United Nations Charter,
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article 51. In other words, a drone attack, according to the DOJ, is an act of national self-defense
by the United States against the enemy they are presently involved in an armed conflict with.
4.2 A Non-International Conflict
It is important to consider the nature of the conflict because there are different applicable
laws, both internationally and domestically, depending on how the conflict is classified. Hence,
the fundamental question becomes: what is the nature of this armed conflict? The DOJ describes
the nature of the armed conflict the United States is currently involved in as “noninternational,83” meaning that it is a conflict between a nation and a transnational non-state actor,
occurring outside of a nation’s territory, and thus, because it is not a clash between nations,84 any
US operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to occur
outside the zone of active hostilities.85 In essence, a drone strike can occur anywhere in the
world, close to a “hot” zone of hostilities or not,86 so long as reliable information has been
received that the targeted person targeted is planning to attack the United States. Effectively,
there are no geographical limits to where a drone strike can occur. This type of armed conflict,
between a nation and a transnational non-state actor, is a relatively new type of conflict, and like
such, there is little judicial or other authoritative precedent, that speaks directly to the question of
the geographic scope of a non-international conflict, argues the DOJ.87 In transition, this does not
restrict the United States from using deadly force on individuals who are planning active
hostilities against the US in certain countries; rather, if:
An operation of the kind discussed in this paper were to occur in a location where al-Qaeda or an
associated force has a significant and organized presence and from which Al-Qaeda or an associated
force, including its senior operational leaders, plan attacks against US person and interests, the operation
would be part of the non-international conflict between the United States and Al-Qaida, and thus within the
scope of the law.88
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In conclusion, if it is determined, through reliable intelligence, that members of Al-Qaida,
including high level senior operational leaders, are actively planning to inflict violence on the
United States, then, because the US in presently engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaida, in
conjunction with the national right to self-defense, it is legally consistent to issue a drone attack
on members of this group; notwithstanding the geographic location.
4.3 Conclusion
The United States justification for drone attacks abroad hinges on two key principles: the
national right to self defense, and the non-international nature of the conflict it is currently
engaged in with Al-Qaida. In other words, according to the DOJ, a drone attack is an act of self
defense that can occur anywhere in the world at any time if it has been reasonably established
that a high level member of Al-Qaida is currently planning to violently attack the United States.
Yet, the weakness of this argument is that it is entirely hypothetical in that it effectively
argues for the legality and legitimacy of a single drone strike on a high-level senior operational
leader of Al-Qaida. Because we now have more than a decade of the strikes being issued and
thus empirical evidence on which we can evaluate the consequences and consider the
repercussions of all the strikes, not one isolated hypothetical strike, it seems superfluous to
continue debating whether or not a single strike is or is legal and/or effective, but rather consider
the evidence, which effectively has become the Bush-Obama Drone Doctrine, and question
whether or not the doctrine has been consistent with IHL and IHRL norms and the fundamental
principles of the law of armed conflict. Considering this, if one accepts that a drone attack on a
foreign citizen in a foreign nation is an act of self-defense, (and not an act of aggression) and the
location of an individual who poses an imminent threat to the security of the United States has
reasonably been established, the issuing of a drone attack on that individual would seem to be in
the scope of war and thus consistent with the laws of war. But when considering the human
consequences of drone attacks and the immense damage that has already been caused by the
drone doctrine, can the doctrine, when considered as a whole, still be legitimate under the
principles of international humanitarian law and customary law?

V. Drone Doctrine Under International Law
5.0 Introduction
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Several things have been established in the course of this paper: the history and evolution
of pilotless flying vehicles began two centuries ago and evolved into present day attack drones,
these drones have been used for attacks issued by the CIA in accordance with the US
government and taken the lives of thousands of innocent civilians in the sovereign nation of
Pakistan and have further weakened the fragile relationship between the two states, and the
United States Department of Justice argues that the drone attacks are legal acts of national self
defense against a transnational non-state group with whom it is presently engaged in an armed
conflict. Moving forward, the drone doctrine will be considered under international law. In order
to do this, terms must be defined, namely an armed conflict and the nature of the conflict. This
will help to determine what international laws and principles are applicable to the drone doctrine,
and allows for a lens by which the drone doctrine can be examined under.
5.1 Terms Defined
International Humanitarian Law is the branch of public international law which regulates
armed conflict by protecting those who are not directly taking place in hostilities and limits the
method and means of warfare.89 The fundamental question then is the US currently engaged in
an armed conflict according to the international community and thus subject to IHL and
customary norms of IL?
The United States government,90 congress,91 and courts92 consider the global war on
terror an armed conflict; and that has already been established. But what acts of violence
constitute an armed conflict in the eyes of the international community? It is clear that acts of
isolated violence, such as rioting or acts of banditry, do not cross the threshold for an armed
conflict.93 Therefore, for violence to qualify as an armed conflict, the attacks should not be
sporadic or isolated, but protracted. In order for protracted violence to exist, and thus an armed
conflict to exist, the violence must cause significant number of deaths.94 Although not all across
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the academic community view the US global war on terror to be a legitimate armed conflict,95
this is clear: the US targeted drone killings have been conducted over a period of time and
carried out in a systematic way,96 and US targeted drone kills have been issued by the CIA, an
entity, and thus a representative, of the US government.97 Moreover, the United Nations security
council’s categorisation of the September 11 attacks as a “threat to peace” indicated to the
international community that the global war on terror is intense and qualifies as an armed
conflict;98 therefore internationally classifying the war on terror as an armed conflict and
justifying the existence of US drone doctrine. Thus, both domestic and international authorities
consider the US to be presently engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and its associated
forces,99 making the conflict not only legitimate, but making it, and the weapons used in it,
subject to the basic principles of the law of armed conflict-a branch of international humanitarian
law.
5.2 The Principles of Law of Armed Conflict
As it has been determined that the United States is presently engaged in an armed
conflict, international humanitarian law, namely the law of armed conflict, is indeed necessarily
applicable. There are several principles that govern the law of armed conflict, that are oftentimes
referred to as the backbone of IHL.100 The purpose of this section is to outline these four basic
principles, and consider how the use of drones during this conflict, not individual, hypothetical
drone attacks, has adhered to or has violated these basic principles. Once again, it is essential to
note that these principles are not hypothetically considered, but through empirical data, reflective
of actual past realities, and thus considered in light of such evidence.
5.2.1 Military Necessity
The first principle to be considered is military necessity. This principle effectively
permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not
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otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the
legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the
earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.101 This principle is
not a new concept102 and has its roots in the Lieber Code article 14 which states that it is legal for
a party to a conflict to use “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war,
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”103 It has been argued that
in times of emergency, in times of crisis, a leader of an armed force or an individual within an
armed force could depart from the laws of war if it was essential for victory,104 however this
argument is now obsolete, for it is clear, that the means to achieve military victory are not
unlimited.105
Has the US drone doctrine adhered to the principle of military necessity? A reasonable
argument may be made that drone strikes, coupled with the counterterrorism efforts from the
United States, have in fact led to the partial submission of Al-Qaeda, for it is true that in recent
years Al-Qaeda and the threat of terrorism have been significantly decreased.106 That being said,
this did not occur with the minimum expenditure of life (when we consider human casualties just
in the case of Pakistan since the drone strikes began in 2004, or the estimated 225,000 total
casualties since the war on terror began107) or of resources (the war on terror has cost the United
States 4 trillion dollars108). However, more specifically, in accordance with the principle of
military necessity, it may be argued that the drone doctrine was needed to fight the war on terror,
and maybe, even perhaps, helped the United States win the war on terror. Yet, at what cost?
Even if it is said that the war on terror is winding down, the cost of the war, both human and
fiscal, was far too high,109 and although Barack Obama has officially ended the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his peaceful politics, has in fact not ended
the war on terror, and his weapon of choice, is and has been the attack drone.
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5.2.2 Humanity
The second principle to be considered is the principle of humanity. This principle
effectively forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the
accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.110 The principle of humanity is based on the
notion that once a military purpose is achieved, the further infliction of suffering is
unnecessary.111 This principle protects civilians by confirming the basic immunity of civilian
objects and civilian populations because civilians and civilian objects make no direct
contribution to war.112 In other words, once a military purpose has been achieved, such as putting
a combatant out of action, the infliction of further suffering by attacking him further is prohibited
by the concept of humanity.113
This is particularly hard to take into context in its relation to the war on terror, because of
the very nature of the war, namely its opponent. Terrorism can never be completely eliminated
from society, it has always existed and it always will, the most one can do is diminish its
occurrences.114 Essentially, one can always make the argument, and always have a somewhat
valid point, that continuing drone strikes and the drone doctrine itself is necessary for the
accomplishment of eliminating terrorism, a legitimate military purpose. Yet, one thing remains
clear, even a legitimate military purpose, such as this apparent terrorist genocide the US is
undertaking, can never justify severe civilian casualties or a departure from the law. It is,
however, important to note, that this principle nor IHL itself sees some sort of utopian world
where civilians aren’t impacted by war; indeed the mark of war is that it affects all in a society,
guilty or innocent, armed or unarmed.115 Yet as it has been clearly discussed in a previous
section, the continuation of suffering on local communities, namely the infliction of severe
psychological suffering, resulting from continuing drone attacks, does nothing to accomplish the
legitimate military purposes of the United States. In fact, if anything, by fostering an attitude of
hate for the United States, it does the opposite.116 In sum, the drone doctrine has indeed proven to
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inflict unnecessary destruction, injury and suffering on civilians who are not military combatants,
and thus, in turn, has not adhered to the principle of humanity.
5.2.3 Distinction
The third principle to be considered in this section is that of distinction. This principle is
another mechanism that protects civilians, for as military operations are only conducted against
the enemies armed forces, there must be a clear distinction between the armed forces and
civilians,117 or between combatants and noncombatants.118 This principle is only logical, and
basically argues, that because civilians do not take a direct part in hostilities, and, so long as they
refrain from doing so, they are protected from attack.119 An important point of this principle has
to do with intelligence and with information.120 Namely, that this obligation to distinguish
between civilians and combatants is dependent on the quality of the information available to the
commander at the time he makes the decisions.121 As such, if the person in charge of issuing the
attack receives information, reviews it honestly and without discrimination, and concludes, with
all the intelligence available to him, that he is attacking a legitimate military target, then he does
not automatically violate the principle of distinction.122 Therefore, the principle of distinction
demands a protection of civilians and an obligation of commanders to clearly distinguish
between a legitimate military target, a combatant and civilians, or noncombatants.123 But, if this
principle is adhered to and a drone attack is issued, like the attack on Khost, Afghanistan in
2002, and then afterwards it is clearly shown to be absent distinction because the attack ends up
killing civilians and/or civilian objects, where does the fault lie? Surely, if this principle is only
considered before the attack is issued, and thus, on a hypothetical level, then one can make the
argument that because of the technological sophistication of drones and the weapons they have, a
single drone attack is actually more discriminatory than other means of warfare.124 However, this
paper is not considering a single, hypothetical drone attack, it is considering the drone doctrine
on the whole, and the compilation of the attacks, when taken together, and when considered with
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the best available empirical evidence,125 the fact that the drone doctrine has indeed not been
discriminatory to citizens becomes clear.
5.2.4 Proportionality
Finally, the last principle to be discussed in this section that is a key proponent in the law
of armed conflict is the principle of proportionality. This principle requires that the losses
resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the expected military
advantage.126 This principle of proportionality first appeared in Additional Protocol I, which
states “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is strictly prohibited.”127 In
essence, if a drone attack does more damage to civilians who are not actively engaged in combat
than it accomplishes the military objective of the conflict as a whole, the attack is in violation of
the principle of proportionality. As such, it has been demonstrated through empirical data that
drone attacks in the nation of Pakistan have done far more damage to civilians and civilian
objects than they have damaged military targets,128 and thus, have been in violation of the
principle of proportionality.
The expected military advantage can be considered by weighing the different possible
military options, such as sending in ground troops or flying over the hostile zone with piloted
aircraft,129 and discerning whether or not the use of a drone, on the area being considered, will do
more benefit to one's army and one’s strategic interests than it will do harm to the local
community. This is a difficult thing to balance, for it is not necessarily possible to predict the
future, and there will always be “blowback” and loss of civilian life, as well as many other
variables at play that one could not possibly know before hand. So why leave the issuing of a
drone attack to predictive events in the future that are all but impossible to know? Why not
instead use the data from drone attacks already issued as a guidepost for predicting future
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attacks? For if this data was considered, then drones would be used sparingly, and with great
hesitation, for the past has taught us that with each drone strike that is issued, a disproportionate
amount of civilians will be affected.
5.3 IHRL Norms and Customary Law
One of the most basic IHRL and IHL norms that enjoys the status of customary
international law is the right to life.130 This right is protected on the international level131 the
regional level132 and the national level.133 The right to life is thus not only a fundamental human
right, but a deeply held right that is protected in times of peace and war.134 In transition, life can
not be taken by arbitrary means, nor can it be taken inappropriately, unjustly, or with a lack of
predictability; and any life that is taken by these means is strictly prohibited under IHRL and
IHL customary law.135 The ICRC confirms the protection of this right to life, and notes that
given the obvious risk to life during an armed conflict, a great deal of IHL is dedicated to
protecting the right to life, thus having a reinforcing, if not beneficial, effect on the right to life
itself.136 The issue of targeted killings was considered by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee in its review of a report submitted by Israel. The committee was very explicit and
clear:
The State Party should not use ‘‘targeted killings’’ as a deterrent or punishment. The State party should
ensure that the utmost consideration is given to the principle of proportionality in all its responses to
terrorist threats and activities. State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in guidelines to
regional military commanders, and complaints about disproportionate use of force should be investigated
promptly by an independent body. Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a
person suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.137
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This is an important statement to consider, for it recognizes the fundamental right to life and
reaffirms the international communities protection of it, by insuring that not only are strikes to be
proportionate, but issued only as a last resort. Consequently, the question becomes: has the drone
doctrine of the United States respected the internationally held right to life by taking life nonarbitrarily, appropriately, justly and predictably?

Life is taken arbitrarily when due process is not
followed and when it is not done in terms sanctioned by the law.138 This right to due process and
a fair trial, which together are included with the right to life, is in line with IHRL norms.139 Yet,
when an individual is merely suspected of being a terrorist, and suspected to be actively planning
hostilities against the United States, and then targeted and killed by a drone, has not this right to
due process of law been undermined? Granted, there are situations where due process may be
impossible, and thus, circumstances where life may be taken arbitrarily but still remain in the
confides of the law.140 These circumstances are where state agents kill in order to preserve the
rights of others; and are essentially taking life in order to protect life. But even these
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circumstances are strictly regulated by IHRL and IHL norms.141 For instance, the individuals life
that is being taken must pose an immediate threat to the life of others therefore making his
elimination an absolute necessity; and in order for it to be lawfully considered a necessity for his
life to be taken, the threat should be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment of deliberation.142” Considering this, it becomes clear that the main purpose of
the IHRL framework which guarantees the right to life is to strictly monitor and review any use
of force whose sole purpose is to deprive life and make sure it is within the confides of the
law. 143 When the right to a fair trial is sacrificed for the greater good and the immediate
protection of life, and thus an individual is determined guilty without due process or a fair trial,
and is targeted by a US drone, a legitimate argument may be made that this individual, if he
poses an instant, overwhelming and immediate threat to the security and safety of others, can be
lawfully targeted and killed. There still is debate within the academic community as to the
legitimacy of this argument, and has even been disputed by some.144 Yet, even if we accept that
in certain circumstances an individual may lose his right to due process and his most
fundamental right to life if his existence poses an immediate threat to the life of others, if the
means of killing this individual, namely a drone attack, has been empirically proven to take a
disproportionate amount of civilian life in the attack, then the loss of life and forfeiting of the
right to life for civilians that results from a drone attack cannot be reasonably remain within the
scope of the law. In sum the right to life is strictly prohibited from being taken arbitrarily, and
considering the sheer amount of lives that have been taken arbitrarily in drone attacks in Pakistan
since 2004,145 the drone doctrine has not respected the internationally held right to life by taking
lives arbitrarily, and for this reason, among others, must be revisited, reviewed, and readjusted.

VI: Conclusions
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The Bush-Obama drone doctrine has been defined as the use of attack drones to
extrajudicially target and kill suspected or known high level members of terrorist organization
Al-Qaeda; irrespective of their geographic location. The United States has applied this doctrine
in as many countries as Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan since 2001; and three
important lessons have been noted from their use, and mustn’t be overlooked. These should be
taken into consideration as the United States contemplates the use of drones as weapons in war in
other countries in the future. Firstly, they are inefficient, and thus, disproportionate, because they
affect untargeted targets more than they do high value targets (HVTS), or senior leaders of AlQaeda:

Secondly, they are counterproductive to US military and strategic interests. And thirdly, the US
drone doctrine as applied in Pakistan has been highly damaging, to infrastructure and to civilians,
and has induced many in Pakistan into a distrust of the US and caused them to live in a state of
fear. These three lessons have been learned from Pakistan through research done in a case study
and an analysis of that case study, and by compiling empirical evidence to support these claims.
In sum, the lessons learned from Pakistan should be a way to move forward and amend the
doctrine; for perhaps in the early years of this policy, the continuation could be excused, for it
was a brand new, and a rather exciting idea. However, now that we have 11 years of empirical
evidence that clearly allows us to see the effects of drone doctrine as it has been applied, there
can be no more excuses for unwarranted injury and trauma being inflicted on innocent people all
over the world, and especially in Pakistan.
Realistically, adjusting and amending this doctrine in the future will not be easy. Yet, it is
presently important to consider the strengths and weaknesses of continuously using attack drones
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in the field of war. There are undeniable strengths in using drones, that include, but are not
limited to: a projection of power, lower risk to US military personnel, more precise than other
weapons, technologically sophisticated, and hypothetically consistent with the laws of war and
the principles of the law of armed conflict. These strengths are what make the use of drones so
appealing to the US. Realizing this, it is only a matter of time until other countries in the world
develop this technology, and that is why it is so important to consider the effects of these
weapons as they have already been used by the US through careful consideration of empirical
evidence, so that precedents that are consistent with the rule of law and protective of civilians are
set; both internationally and domestically.
Indeed, that is the importance of this topic, for as the world becomes more
technologically advanced, the nature of war will continue to change, and the weapons used in
war will continue to change. There is somewhat of a consensus across the academic community
that war and its weapons are becoming more robotic and automated, and as attack drones are
really the first weapon of its kind, they are just the tip of the iceberg. Yet, as the nature of war
will undoubtedly change, and the weapons used in war will inevitably change, the basic
principles of law and the rights they guarantee, they cannot change. We must understand the
sophistication of this weapon, and realize its differences to older and traditional weapons, but not
lose sight of the rule of law, and the people the law and the adherence to it protects. Noting this,
we must understand the weaknesses of the drone doctrine and the use of drones, that include, but
are not limited to: more damaging to non targeted people than targeted people, counterproductive
to US interests, limited accountability for resulting damage, empirically inconsistent with
principles and norms of international law, no due process of law or fair trial for those targeted
and killed, and the undermining of the rule of law. Thus, noting these distressing realities, there
are several steps the US can take, as well as the international community, to readjust the
doctrine, and set a precedent for the use of drones and weapons like them in the future.
First of all, the US must be more accountable. One of the fundamental steps to good
governance and to progress itself is accountability, and how does a government be accountable?
By being transparent. Thus, the US government should release their official information of the
effects and usages of drones, and transfer back responsibility from the CIA, an agency who
infamously works in covert and secretive ways, and back to the US government, and thus, the
people of the US, entirely. Second of all, the US should respect and observe IHRL norms and
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IHL principles in its struggle against terrorism by being thorough in gathering information on
which decisions to target are made and targeting only individuals who are legitimate targets in
terms of the law. Moreover, this requires that the US distinguish civilians from legitimate targets
in a way that is more empirically acceptable and that severely limits the collateral damage,
making it acceptable to the principle of proportionality. Finally, the international community,
specifically the United Nations and international organizations such as the United Nations High
Commission on Human Rights and the International Committee on the Red Cross, should
continue to censure and discourage the manner in which the US is conducting it use of drones.
Like such, these organizations should call on the US to release its official data on the use of
drones to the international community, and thus, be more accountable to the international
community. After all, the drone doctrine is an international policy, and has repercussions on the
whole of the international community, so not only is there domestic action that must be taken to
improve the doctrine, but perhaps more importantly, there is international action that must be
taken and conceivably without which any further improvement to the policy would not be
possible. All in all, it is a dangerous thing for the US to continue playing judge, jury and
executioner, and if the international community does not take notice soon, the Bush-Obama
Drone Doctrine will continue to be used and codified in the coming years; and the lessons
learned from Pakistan will become seemingly irrelevant.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Conferences
CICG: “Access to Health.” Presenters on Conflict Resolution and International Humanitarian
Law. Geneva, Switzerland. 22 February 2013.
CICG: “Secretary General Ban Ki-moon: 10 Years Ago Bagdad.” Geneva, Switzerland. 01
March 2013.
Lectures

36

International Committee for the Red Cross. “A Brief Introduction to Humanitarian Law and the
Law of Armed Conflict.” ICRC headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland. 26 February 2013.
Personal Interviews
Ajormansan, Stee. UNHCHR Headquarters. Personal Interview. Geneva, Switzerland. 26 April
2013.
Melser, Nilz. Geneva Center for Security Policy. Personal Interview. Geneva, Switzerland. 01
May 2013.
Mohamedou, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould. Geneva Center for Security Policy. Personal
Interview. Geneva, Switzerland. 12 April 2013.
Vautravers, Alexandre. Webster University. Personal Interview. Geneva, Switzerland. 02 May
2013.
Veuthey, Michael. International Institute for Humanitarian Law. Personal Interview. Geneva,
Switzerland. 04 May 2013.

Secondary Sources
Books
Altman, Andre. Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World. Oxford Press.
January 2013. Chapters 6, 12, 17. United States. Pgs 130-148, 198-210, 234-244.
Cornelisse, Diana G. “Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the
United States Air Force During the First Century of Powered Flight.” Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio: U.S. Air Force Publications, 2002.
CTIE: Reginald Denny (1891-1967), “The Dennyplane” RPAV: Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles.
Aviation and Aeromodelling-Interdependent Evolutions and Histories, 04 July 2003.

37

Donald, David, edition 12. “Encyclopedia of World Aircraft, Chapter 36: Standard Aircraft.”
Etobicoke, Ontario. Prospero Books, 1997, 854-910.
Goebel, Greg. “Air Vectors.” Chapter 3: The Lighting Bug Reconnaissance Drones.” and
“Chapter 4: Modern US Target Drones”. ed., 2.0.0, United States. March 2008.
McDaid Hugh and Barton Strong. "Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology."RPAV:
Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles. Aviation and Aeromodelling-Interdependent Evolutions and
Histories, 02 February 2003.
McMahan, Jeff. “Targeted Killing: Murder, Combat or Law Enforcement?” Oxford Press.
September 2012. United States.
Melzer, Nilz. "ICRC's interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities
under international humanitarian law: International Committee of the Red Cross." Worldwide
Press. November 2010.
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict. Oxford Press, 2004. pg 22 Section 2.2 “Military
Necessity.”
Statman, Daniel. Can Just War Theory Justify Targeted Killing? Chicago University Press.
October 2012. Chapter 12: Just War Theory Revisited. United States.
Court Cases
Boumediene v Bush 553 US 723. 72F. (D.D.C 2008).
Gherebi v Obama 609 US 55. 12W-87W. (D.D.C 2009).
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2D 63, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2009).
Hamdan v Rumsfeld 548 US 557. 51-54. (D.D.C 2008).
Prosecutor v Haradinaj and Cors Judgment. IT-04-84-T ICTY. 90F. (D.D.C 2008).
Prosecutor v Limaj Judgment. IT-03-66-T ICTY. 45. (D.D.C 2005).
Thomas J Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507-518. (plurality opinion, D.D.C 2004).

38

Government Publications
Haqqani, Husain. "A Realistic Approach to US-Pakistani Relations." Center for the National
Interest. (2012): Student Research Center. pg. 1.
Kronstadt, Alan K. "Pakistan-US Relations." CRS Issue Brief For Congress OB94041 (2005):
10-49. Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.
United States. The Department of Justice. “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against A
US Citizen Who Is Known to Be a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated
Force.” Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2012.NBC Media. MSNBC Media, 20 Jan.
2012. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.
Journal Articles
Barber, RJ “The proportionality equation: balancing military objectives with civilian lives in the
armed conflict in Afghanistan” (2010)15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 467. April 2012.
Baum, Deborah. "Estimated Cost of Post 9/11 Wars: 225,000 Lives, up to $4 Trillion." Brown
University. Costs of War Project, 29 June 2012.
Blank, LR & Farley BR “Characterizing US operations in Pakistan: is the United States engaged
in an armed conflict?” (2011) 34 Fordham International Law Journal 153. 02 February 2011.
Clode, George. "Predator Drone Specifications." Military History Monthly 12 (2012): 1-12.
Student Research Guide. February 2004.
G S Corn et al ‘America's longest held prisoner of war: lessons learned from the capture,
prosecution, and extradition of General Manuel Noriega’ (2011)71 Louisiana Law Review 1112.
January 2011.
International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at New York University Law School
and Stanford Law School. "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians From
Drone Practices in Pakistan." 16 September 2012.

39

Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vité International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law. Document Number 30-04-1993 Article, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 293.
Murphy, Dale. “Terrorism and the concept of an armed attack in Article 51 of the UN charter”
(2002) 41. Harvard International Law Journal 47-50. 15 August 2007.
Pearson, Lee. "Developing the Flying Bomb." Encyclopedia of World Aircraft (2004):
History.navy. Naval Air Systems Command, 04 September 2004.
Regianle, John. "Biography of Francis Gary Powers." National Cold War Database. Royal Air
Force, 05 July 2012.
Shaw, Ian. “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones”, Student
Research Guide, January 2011.
Thompson, Chengeta. “Are US Drone Targeted Killings Within the Confines of the Law?” The
International Criminal Court, The Hague, Netherlands. 31 October 2011. Accessed April 24,
2013. 29.
Newspaper Articles
Jo Becker and Scott Shane, A Measure of Change: Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obama’s
Principles and Will. The New York Times, May 12, 2012.
Miller, Greg, and Julie Tate. "CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets." Washington Post. The
Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2011.
"More About Balloons." The Scientific American. March 1849, pg 3. As Reported in the Presse
of Vienna, Austria, March 1849.
Peter Bergen and Megan Braun, “Drone is Obama’s Weapon of Choice,” CNN. Sept 6, 2012.

40

Siobhan Gorman and Evan Perez. “Obama Relents on Secret Drone Memo.” The Wall Street
Journal. 6 Feb 2013.
Tutu, Desmond. “A Call to Civility.” New York Times, 12 February 2013. Accessed 24 April
2013.
Online Videos
Brennan, John. “Remarks at the Program on Law and Security, Harvard Law School:
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws.” Youtube. 16 September 2011.
Cheney, Dick. “The Morning Show.” CBS. January 2012. Youtube. Accessed 24 April 2013.
Obama, Barack. “Obama Administration Counterterrorism Strategy” (C-Span television),
originally broadcasted on June 29, 2011. Youtube. Accessed 24 April 2013.
Treaties and Conventions
Additional Protocol I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1977
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 4 of African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
Article 4 of American Charter on Human Rights.
Article 2 of European Charter on Human Rights.
Lieber Code, Article 14.

UN Documents and Reports
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials UN Doc
A/CONF 144/28/Rev 1 112 para 9 (1990). Accessed April 24, 2013.
"Charter, United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace and Acts of Aggression." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

41

Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc.
CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 1, April 24 2013.
United Nations Security Council, 4370th Meeting, “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1368
(2001),
Council Calls on All States to Bring Perpetrators to Justice.” Article 3, Line 5.
UN Human Rights Committee Comment Number 305/1988 UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/305/1998
(15 August 1990). Paragraph 5.8.
Websites
The Bureau. "Obama 2009 Pakistan Strikes." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Covert
War on Terror-the Database, 10 Apr. 2011. Web.
The Bureau. "Obama 2011, 2012, 2013 Pakistan Strikes." The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism. Covert War on Terror-the Database, 10 Apr. 2011. Web.
The Bureau. "Obama’s Covert War." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Covert War on
Terror-the Database, 10 Apr. 2011.
The Bureau. "Pakistan Strikes." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Covert War on Terrorthe Database, 10 Apr. 2011. Web.
Pew Research Center, Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of the US: 74% Call America
an Enemy. March 2012. Web.

